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Despite the growing scientific, political, and public recognition of global climate 
change (Ury 2011; IPCC Summary 2013), an increasingly partisan debate in US 
politics threatens to undermine the movement’s momentum evident a decade ago. 
Public opinion, while generally recognizing the reality of climate change, remains 
ambivalent on its causes and public policy implications (Dunlap and McCright 
2008; Guber 2012; Zajko 2011). The lack of a galvanized public undoubtedly 
emboldens many national leaders to sidestep consideration of climate change. The 
recent US disengagement from the Paris Climate Agreement and the response of 
states, cities, and other actors to this decision (Popovich and Schlossberg 2017) is 
one more twist in what Rabe (2008: 105) refers to as the “odyssey of climate change 
policy.”   
     Notwithstanding this apparent pause in the climate change movement, 
subnational governments play a significant role in addressing climate change at the 
local level (Betsill 2001). Cities can address local sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and simultaneously affect the tenor of public debate and policy. 
According to Bulkeley (2010), cities have a significant carbon footprint, perhaps as 
much as 75 percent of global GHG emissions, although estimates vary. Lee and 
Koski (2012) add that cities control a number of factors of modern life that 
contribute directly to the problem of GHG emissions, including land use, municipal 
waste, and building codes. At the same time, municipalities are limited in their 
capacity to “own” and manage sources of GHG emissions for which they have little 
control, particularly in the absence of state and federal policy.  
     Cities must also overcome the “rationality” of climate inaction; cities can neither 
limit the benefits of climate mitigation to their own boundaries nor insulate 
themselves from the effects of GHG emissions outside those boundaries (Krause 
2011). As Engle and Orbach (2008: 120) note: "In such instances, free riding is 
often the economically superior course of action." Individual cities contribute 
relatively little to the overall problem of climate change, thus motivating action at 
this level runs counter to individual rationality in a global commons (Zahran 2010). 
Encouraging cities to address climate change in the face of limited expectation of 
success represents an interesting collective action problem. 
     The evolution of several “city networks” at both the national and global level 
indicates that these collective behavior problems are not insurmountable. In the 
United States, the largest city network by far is the United States Conference of 
 
Mayors (USCM) Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA). The MCPA 
evolved in 2005 from the effort of a few mayors. Signatories of the MCPA 
committed their cities to reducing GHG emissions to 7 percent below their 1990 
levels by 2012, the same goal as the Kyoto Treaty when it became effective in 2006. 
Almost 1000 cities had signed the agreement by 2009 (USCM 2009), representing 
the majority of mayors in the conference, 5 percent of cities, and 30 percent of the 
US population (Krause 2010). While the shelf life of the agreement did not extend 
past 2012, the USCM has nonetheless continued to promote a variety of climate 
protection policies, research, and official recognition of exemplary city practices.1  
     States have also taken on a significant role in promoting energy and climate 
policy despite the absence of federal policy leadership (Barbour and Deakin 2012; 
Zahran et al. 2010; Vasseur 2014). The majority of states are addressing energy 
issues with the goal of reducing energy use and promoting alternative sources of 
power (see Carley 2011 for a review). Currently, 34 states have a state Climate 
Action Plan (CAP) (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2017). Kwon et al. 
(2014) argue that states can play an entrepreneurial role promoting climate 
activism. Most state CAPs were enacted in the first decade of this century, 
reflecting greater bi-partisan agreement regarding the need to address climate 
change. Since then, climate debates have become increasingly fractious; although 
most states continued to promote a wide portfolio of energy policies (Carley 2011), 
a few states have backpedaled on such commitments (Deitchman 2017: 50). 
      Thus, while cities and states are central to the climate debate, the degree to 
which state-level factors influence municipal climate activism remains uncertain. 
Krause (2010: 48) argues it is logical to expect that a certain degree of “vertical 
diffusion” exists between states and cities regarding climate policy. Policy 
diffusion from cities and states to the federal government has characterized a 
number of public policies, including state-mandated recycling. Selin and 
VanDeveer (2007) add that policy diffusion exists across municipal networks, as 
well as other organized coalitions promoting policy innovation and learning among 
sub-state actors, including state regional climate initiatives, public-private 
partnerships, and private sector groups. Thus, we would expect that states leading 
in climate planning will also have a greater number of cities and a larger percentage 
of the population associated with MCPA. However, several factors are also likely 
to influence state-level municipal activism, including civic capacity and coastal 
proximity (Brody et al. 2009), partisanship (Deitchman 2017; Geri and McNabb 
2011), climate stress (Zahran et al. 2008), and state energy leadership (Selin and 
 
VanDeveer 2007). This research examines whether state sociodemographic factors 
and energy policy are associated with two measures of municipal climate activism 
treated as a state-level phenomenon.        
Climate Protection and City Networks 
Several major “city networks” (Lee and van de Meene 2012: 200) have evolved to 
address climate change. The municipal climate protection movement, however, is 
of relatively recent origin, corresponding to the growth of global climate change as 
an environmental problem. One of the first networks to evolve was the International 
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) Cities for Climate Protection 
(CCP). This network has grown to over 1000 cities throughout the world (Bulkeley 
2010). Betsill (2001) notes that the CCP project formed in 1990, establishing the 
Urban CO2 Reduction Project or UCRP in the US, Canada, and Europe the 
following year. In 1993, this campaign morphed into the CCP campaign. The CCP 
campaign requires cities to issue an executive decree binding the city to the CCP 
campaign goal. By 2001, 79 US cities were part of the CCP. As Zahran et al. (2008) 
note, the campaign moves cities from emission analysis to action plans with specific 
timetables for targeting CO2 emissions to 20 percent below 1990 levels, which is 
significantly more proactive than the Kyoto Treaty. Bulkeley (2010) indicates that 
a second wave of networks formed in the 2000s. These newer networks are more 
likely to have evolved within national contexts, the US Conference of Mayors being 
one of the first to do so in 2005.2 
     Much of the research on climate city networks examines differences between 
signatory and nonsignatory cities as well as the "rationality" of joining a city 
network. For example, Zahran et al. (2008) examine the ecological factors for why 
cities participate in climate change activities despite the free rider problem, 
focusing on climate risk, such as proximity to the east or west coast, local climate 
stressors, and civic capacity to adapt locally. Such commitments are more likely 
when regional planning and coordinating entities reduce the cost of participation to 
localities and increase the selective incentives for doing so. Overcoming such costs 
has often entailed framing climate actions in terms of the additional “co-benefits” 
that are realized (Kwon et al. 2014), such as economic growth or future fiscal 
payoffs. Betsill (2001) also emphasizes the importance of “local hooks” when 
framing climate protection, to “think locally, act locally” (p. 404), particularly as 
this relates to such local issues as air quality, quality of life, and development. 
Furthermore, while cities have “localized the policy of controlling GHG emissions” 
 
(p. 398), many cities nonetheless frame the issue as a global problem. Where cities 
do not traditionally prioritize environmental protection, such hooks may not be 
available to address climate mitigation or adaptation. Brody et al. (2009) underscore 
the significance of local excludable benefits, but also the importance of climate 
risks or anthropogenic climate stressors, and local capacity to address GHG 
emissions for predicting municipal climate action. 
     The question raised by this research and others is why some cities engage in 
climate activism, or conversely, why some do not. As Hamin et al. (2014) note, 
local governments that lack access to peer cities, regional networks, or progressive 
state policies are likely to face greater obstacles in implementing such plans at the 
local level. Research on coastal communities in Massachusetts experiencing sea 
level increases suggests that these “capacity constraints” (p. 113) make planning 
challenging even when climate change is evident. As Wood et al. (2014) argue, 
local leaders face a variety of community attitudes regarding climate change from 
active support to apathy and hostility. Where municipal leaders cannot count on a 
supportive community environment, signing the MCPA, or more recent USCM 
pledges, could be politically problematic. Their research points out that while “viral 
governance” has encouraged states and municipalities to engage in climate 
planning, the reality on the ground is much more complex. Many communities are 
reframing climate problems as “something else” (p. 548) and thus bypassing 
potentially adverse community reactions. 
     An important issue to address, particularly if cities become the primary agents 
of climate policy, is whether municipal climate actions have a significant impact in 
reducing GHG emissions. Wang (2012) asserts that there is a tendency for cities to 
focus on “win-win” measures that emphasize the co-benefits of climate action, 
particularly those related to mitigation rather than adaptation. This may be 
particularly true for the MCPA compared to the ICLEI-CCP network, which is 
more predictive of those climate actions not typically taken by cities to mitigate 
GHG emissions. On the other hand, Wood et al (2014) and Krause (2011) found 
significantly higher mean number of mitigation actions for MCPA signatory cities 
compared to their nonsignatory counterparts. Similarly, Lee and Koski (2012) 
found that MCPA cities had a higher number of green building projects, specifically 
those that are Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEEDS) certified. 
However, as Wang (2012) notes, the MCPA’s lack of enforcement mechanisms or 
consequences for not meeting emission goals makes it difficult to distinguish 
symbolic or politically expedient statements from more substantial commitments.   
 
     In summary, many US cities are engaged in climate activism despite having to 
overcome significant disincentives for doing so. Factors identified with increasing 
municipal climate activism of particular note are local climate risks, civic capacity, 
local organizational capacity, political partisanship, commitment to a climate 
agreement, and membership in a peer network promoting climate activism. Mayors 
facing uncertain local political support may nonetheless address climate change if 
state energy plans and political climate provide a rationale for action. The following 
section outlines the evolution of states’ response to climate change.  
The Role of States in Promoting Climate Action 
Geri and McNabb (2011) note that at least since the budget cuts of the 1980s under 
the Reagan Administration, energy policy has increasingly become the province of 
states. As with other matters left to the states, policy innovation has led to “. . . 
either a profusion of experimentation, or a hodgepodge of inconsistent and 
conflicting standards, depending on one’s perspective” (2011: 101). Despite this, 
as Carley (2011: 291) notes, states are pursuing a wide variety of energy policy 
goals focusing on three broad outcomes—diversification, decentralization, and 
decarbonization. Fischlein et al. (2014) suggest that energy policy is largely the 
purview of states, both in terms of setting broad policy objectives, the 
implementation of these policies, and the regulation of public utilities. Given the 
relative absence of federal climate policy specifically targeting carbon emissions, 
states have become “laboratories for climate change policy” (p. 171). State Energy 
Offices exist in every state but play very different roles, some acting with relative 
autonomy and others whose function is subsumed under other departments 
(Deitchman 2017: 8-10). While some states are clearly early adopters of climate 
policy (Posner 2010: 78) and leading by example, such as California (see Kwon et 
al. 2012; Barbour and Deakin 2012), other states are back pedaling regarding 
energy efficiency and renewable energy standards (Deitchman 2017: 50; Center for 
Climate and Energy Solutions 2017). Despite such variance in approach, states are 
making significant headway in reducing GHG emissions (Drummon 2010), 
promoting renewable energy (Vasseur 2014; Carley 2012), financing energy 
projects (Deitchman 2017), and other outcomes that promote energy development 
(Carley 2016). As Geri and McNabb (2011: 79) note though, the availability of 
encompassing federal subsidies enabled states to make such broad energy and 
climate commitments, particularly during the economic recovery.  
 
     Rabe (2004; 2008; 2011) argues that states are the primary locus of climate 
change governance, but not only because of federal reticence to engage consistently 
across presidential administrations. States have come to define the issue in terms of 
their own political and/or economic self-interests, addressing a variety of energy 
issues, including energy development and efficiency, responding to climate related 
events, positioning themselves as climate leaders, and managing municipal waste. 
Much of the groundwork for climate change policy developed in the 1990s prior to 
the Kyoto debate. By the late 1990s, partisan pushback was occurring not only in 
Washington, D.C., but also in state houses, some of whom rallied against treaty 
ratification as well as climate action in the absence of federal leadership. While 
some states inhibited efforts to address climate change, all states nonetheless 
continued to promote energy policies of one kind or another, albeit with differing 
motivations. The framing of energy issues, including climate change, differs from 
state to state, sometimes explicitly addressing the reduction of GHG emissions or 
through such “stealth” policies as energy efficiency, vehicle use reduction, and 
renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS). The rise of the MCPA occurred 
between 2005-2007, during what Rabe (2011) refers to as the period “state 
domination” of climate policy (1997-2007). The election of President Obama and 
the Supreme Court ruling in Massachusetts vs. EPA in 2007 providing the EPA the 
statutory authority to regulate carbon dioxide as an air pollutant began a new period 
of “contested federalism,” involving renewed efforts by the federal government to 
define the climate agenda.  
     Geri and McNabb (2011: 104) argue that energy policy in the first decade of this 
century was a comparatively bi-partisan endeavor. Debates around climate change 
policy, at least at the Federal level, have since taken on the more partisan character 
associated with environmental policy. As Rabe (2011) notes above, some of this 
partisanship has migrated to the states. The MCPA emerged at a time where there 
was national recognition of the significance of climate change, the value of 
increasing energy efficiency and renewable energy, and decreasing reliance on 
foreign sources of power. As Deitchman (2017: 65) asserts, state-level climate 
policy innovation occurred when the majority of state houses were under 
Democratic control. The changing tide of political control of state governments to 
the Republican Party may be consequential for the continued retreat from the 
carbon economy. Deitchman asserts that the “. . . generalization and conventional 
wisdom that Democrats support more stringent action on greenhouse gas emissions 
mitigation than their Republican Party counterparts is accurate and verifiable” 
 
(2017: 49-50). However, many states pursue energy policies that are beneficial to 
GHG reductions, such as renewable energy and stricter building codes, without 
specific reference to climate change (Selin and VanDeveer 2007; Wood et al. 
2014).   
     States thus play a central role in defining the energy and climate policy agenda 
by promoting a wide portfolio of policy instruments but with significant variation 
across states (Fischlein et al. 2014). It is logical to expect that states with 
demonstrated leadership in promoting the reduction of GHG emissions would also 
have a higher prevalence of municipal climate activism. We examine the impact of 
state-level energy and climate policy,  as well as other factors identified in the 
literature (Krause 2010; Zahran et al. 2008; Wang 2012; Brody et al. 2009; Kwon 
et al. 2014), on municipal climate activism, but focus solely on US states as the unit 
of analysis.  
 
Methodology 
A large degree of variation in policy, economic and industrial activity, culture, and 
other factors characterizes the US political system. Thus, while individual US states 
exist within one singular society, there is incredible diversity within states, making 
a state-based comparison highly appealing. Many comparable studies have assessed 
phenomena—including policy and environmental conditions—via a state level 
analysis (Clement & Schultz 2011, Dietz et al. 2015, Tung et al. 2014, Valdmanis 
2015, Vasseur 2014). As with previous research, the current study utilizes data 
gathered from a variety of sources, all measured at the state level for a few 
methodological reasons. First, there is no consistent municipal-level data for 
environmental organizations, political representation or ideology, and other social 
factors for making appropriate comparisons. Second, many of the signatory 
municipalities exist within larger Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) thus 
complicating the analysis. Aggregating data at the state level simplifies these 
problems. Data sources reflect either specific years or a range of years 
corresponding to the efforts of the USCM MCPA campaign.  
     Our analysis uses two dependent variables: (1) the percentage of a state’s 
residents who reside in cities covered by the MCPA as of 2010, and (2) the ratio of 
signatory cities (N=1060) to the number of a state’s cities with populations of 
25,000 or more using Census data for 2005, the approximate start of the MCPA. 
Because the number of signatory cities exceeds the number of cities with 
 
populations of 25,000 or more for some states, City Ratio can exceed one. As 
expected, the number of signatory cities correlates strongly (r=.807) with the 
number of a state’s cities with populations of 25,000 or more.  
     The grouping of the independent variables derives primarily from existing 
research on municipal climate activism to include social, political, and economic 
factors. Social factors are civic capacity, population size, population density, and 
income inequality. Civic capacity is measured by combining z-scores for 
percentage of state residents with a Bachelor’s degree and average household 
income (Cronbach’s alpha=.90). State population and population density are likely 
to be associated with greater state economic and other resources to address climate 
change. The state’s Gini Index is included in the analysis as a measure of income 
inequality. To the extent that income inequality reduces state overall quality of life 
(Valdamis 2015: 989), we can expect that it will also undermine public support for 
climate action.   
     Political factors included are state partisanship and the number of environmental 
organizations. As Medoff (1997) notes, state representatives’ voting record and the 
average percent voting for a Presidential candidate can provide an indicator of state 
partisanship. The League of Conservation Voters National Environmental 
Scorecard for both the US Senate and House of Representatives afforded the first 
measure aggregated for 2006 to 2010. Average percentage voting Democrat for the 
2004, 2008, and 2012 US presidential elections provided a second measure of 
Partisanship. The National Center for Charitable Statistics records (2014) specified 
the number of environmental non-profit organizations filing form 990 in a state for 
the year 2010. The number of environmental non-profit organizations, rather than 
the number of these organizations per capita, arguably provides a better indicator 
of a state’s social capital potential for environmental action (Brody et al. 2009). We 
would expect that states with stronger environmental records, higher percentages 
of Democratic voters (Wang 2012: 604), and a greater number of environmental 
organizations would be more likely to have higher levels of municipal climate 
activism. 
     The only economic factor examined is the proportion of a state’s total 
employment that is involved in extraction, manufacturing, transportation, or 
production industries. As Zahran et al. (2008) note, while social and civic capacity 
enhance the potential for climate activism, greater investment in the carbon-based 
economy represents a barrier. Additionally, coastal states experience, or will likely 
experience, greater risk associated with climate change (with both rising sea levels 
 
and the proximity to other climatological phenomena like hurricanes) increasing 
the likelihood of municipal climate action. We expect that states with higher levels 
of carbon employment will have lower levels of municipal climate activism, while 
proximity to the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans will increase it.  
     Three dichotomous measures from the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 
are the basis of state energy and climate policy: (1) a State Climate Action Plan 
(CAP), (2) a mandatory Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS), and (3) an 
Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS). The presence or absence of these 
policies are noted for 2008 or prior, approximately the middle of the MCPA 
campaign. Scores are summed together to create State Leader ranging between 0 
and 3 (Cronbach’s alpha=.789). While the resulting measure clearly assesses more 
than just state climate policy, a more expansive measure differentiates policy 
leadership.3 As Carley (2011) indicates, RPS and EERS policies adoption rates vary 
across states and may be more indicative of energy policy innovations than climate 
policy alone. Fourteen states have enacted all three policies, an equal number have 
enacted none, and eleven each respectively have adopted one or two (see Appendix 
A for more details of these variables). Adoption of these policies should be 
positively associated with sub-state climate activism.4 Addressing this question 
directly, Krause (2010) demonstrates that state CAP and GHG emission targets, 
along with political ideology, and percent of state employment in manufacturing, 
are unrelated to the MCPA signatory status of cities with populations of 25,000 or 
more. Excluding cities with populations less than 25,000, however, may have 
underestimated these effects. As Kwon et al. (2014) and Osofsky (2012) argue, 
state CAPs or other environmental and energy policies can affect municipal climate 














Table 1: Study Variables 
State Characteristic Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
Dependent Variables 
Percentage of State  






































Civic Capacity (Z score) -1.76 2.03 0 .95 
Gini Index .40 .50 .45 .02 
League of Conservation  
Voters Scorecard for all 
Congress 
8.5 95.9 55.5 26.4 
Average Percentage  
voting Democrat (2004-
2012) 
28.3 65.7 48.2 9.3 
Population Density 
(persons per square mile) 





25 1375 209.75 220.1 
Proportion of workers 



















     















Table 2 Rank Order of States by Percentage for Covered State 
Population 
 
Rank State Covered 
Population 
Rank State Covered 
Population 
1 NY 55.17 26 MI 24.11 
2 AZ 48.38 27 ND 23.27 
3 AK 46.89 28 HI 21.90 
4 CA 44.17 29 ID 21.59 
5 NV 43.62 30 MO 20.85 
6 NM 42.10 31 PA 20.75 
7 NE 39.86 32 VA 18.16 
8 IL 38.90 33 CO 17.55 
9 OR 35.88 34 ME 17.26 
10 MA 34.27 35 KS 17.14 
11 NJ 34.24 36 DE 15.35 
12 WA 34.22 37 MD 15.10 
13 MN 33.58 38 AR 14.50 
14 RI 33.21 39 LA 14.09 
15 FL 32.03 40 GA 12.09 
16 CT 31.38 41 SC 10.24 
17 NC 31.00 42 MS 10.12 
18 IA 29.87 43 AL 8.87 
19 NH 27.74 44 UT 7.94 
20 IN 27.59 45 VT 7.67 
21 TX 27.54 46 TN 4.63 
22 WI 26.53 47 OK 3.83 
23 OH 24.67 48 SD 2.83 
24 MT 24.42 49 WV 2.33 
25 KY 24.41 50 WY 1.71 
 
Table 2 reports the percentage of the state population covered by the MCPA 
agreement. The range falls between 1.7 percent for Wyoming to 55.2 percent for 
New York, the only state where the majority of the population is covered. New 
York City’s participation in the MCPA clearly helped New York state rise to the 
top place. As noted earlier, some 1,060 cities have signed on to the agreement, 
representing 30 percent of the US population. As the table suggests, significant 
 
percentage differences exist between states. Regional differences (not reported in 
the table) are also evident with Western states having the highest average of 30.0 
percent, followed by the Northeast (29.1 percent), Midwest (25.8 percent), and the 
South (15.3 percent).   
 
Table 3 Rank Order of States by City Ratio 
Rank State City Rate Rank State City Rate 
1 ME 5.00 26 WI 0.77 
2 HI 4.00 27 MA 0.76 
3 NJ 3.44 28 KS 0.75 
4 VT 2.00 29 KY 0.7 
5 MD 1.86 30 MI 0.69 
6 NH 1.80 31 IL 0.69 
7 NC 1.67 32 AZ 0.65 
8 AK 1.67 33 VA 0.63 
9 IA 1.65 34 SC 0.57 
10 NY 1.42 35 RI 0.57 
11 MN 1.36 36 OH 0.57 
12 PA 1.25 37 CA 0.56 
13 SD 1.00 38 NE 0.50 
14 NM 1.00 39 ND 0.50 
15 DE 1.00 40 IN 0.50 
16 CT 1.00 41 GA 0.50 
17 FL 0.99 42 AR 0.38 
18 OR 0.94 43 WY 0.33 
19 WA 0.92 44 LA 0.33 
20 MO 0.88 45 TX 0.33 
21 CO 0.85 46 TN 0.32 
22 NV 0.83 47 AL 0.32 
23 MT 0.83 48 MS 0.28 
24 WV 0.80 49 UT 0.16 
25 ID 0.78 50 OK 0.14 
 
 
    Table 3 reports the ratio of signatory cities to the number of cities with a 
population of 25,000 or more (City Ratio). As noted earlier, City Ratio indicates 
the degree of diffusion across cities within the state and thus adjusts (in part) for 
variation in the number of municipalities and state population. The City Ratio varies 
between a low .14 for Oklahoma, to a high of 5.0 for Maine. As with covered state 
population, City Ratio varies between regions (not reported in table) with the 
highest being the Northeast (1.9) followed by the West (1.0), the Midwest (.82), 
and the South (.62). The Pearson correlation of .299 (p≤.05) indicates that both 
indicators are measuring similar but also unique dimensions of state climate 
activism. Outlier and normality analysis of the data indicated that Covered State 
Population approximates normality. For City Ratio, three outlier states (Maine, 
Hawaii, and New Jersey) exceeded three standard deviations prompting deletion 
from the analysis, resulting in an approximately normal but slightly positively 
skewed distribution.   
 































.496* .539* -.030 -.507* .366* .463* 
State  
Pop 
 --- .517* .065 .224 .660* -.168 .227 .269 
Gini 
Index 
  --- .075 .173 .156 -.127 -.028 .293* 
LCV 
Score 
   --- .881* .271 -555* .628* .229 
Avg.   
Democrat 
    --- .212 -.621* .725* .373** 
Envir. 
Orgs 
     --- -110 .146 .113 
Carbon 
Employ 
      --- -.521* -.344* 
State 
Leader 
       --- .144 
*(p≤.05) 
  
     Table 4 reports the correlation matrix for all the independent variables. Results 
indicate a predictable pattern of intercorrelations between social, environmental, 
and political factors. Carbon Employment correlates as expected with Civic 
 
Capacity, population density, LCV score, and average percent Democrat with 
Pearson correlations ranging between -507 to -.692. Overall, results suggest 
moderate to strong positive intercorrelations between State Leader and Civic 
Capacity (.513), LCV score (.628), average percent Democrat (.725), and 
negatively with Carbon Employment (-.521). The correlation between LCV score 
and average percent Democrat (.881) suggests the possibility of collinearity. To 
overcome this problem for the following regression analysis, the z-score 
transformations for both variables were averaged together as a combined measure 
of political and environmental partisanship (Cronbach’s Alpha=.937). Higher 
Partisanship scores represent states with higher percentage of Democratic voters 
and higher LCV score. 
 
Table 5 Stepwise Linear Regression Results Predicting Covered 
State Population 





.241 .011  
Partisanship 
 










     Table 5 reports the forward stepwise regression results for covered state 
population. Forward stepwise regression enters predictor variables into the equation 
one at a time in order of their correlation with the dependent variable. The process 
stops when additional variables no longer contribute significantly to the explained 
variance (Mertler and Vannatta 2005: 170). Stepwise regression is the preferred 
analysis strategy given the limited number of cases (N=50) and the number of 
independent variables. The results indicate that only Partisanship is significantly 
associated with covered state population, accounting for 65 percent of the variance 
between states. Thus, other factors do not contribute to a significant improvement 
in the variance after accounting for the influence of Partisanship. The results are 
surprising given the amount of variance explained, and by the general lack of 
significant association for other variables.  
 
 
Table 6 Stepwise Linear Regression Results Predicting City 
Ratio 





.543 .094  
State Leader 
 












     Table 6 repeats the forward stepwise regression for City Ratio. City Ratio 
accounts for the degree of diffusion of the MCPA among cities by examining the 
ratio of the number of signatory cities (some of whom have a population less than 
25,000) relative to cities with a population of 25,000 or more. This measure of 
municipal climate activism provides a partial adjustment for state population. The 
inclusion of state population in the regression equation is an additional control. The 
results indicate that only State Leader emerges as significant, with an adjusted r2 
of .243. As with Covered State Population, other study factors did not contribute 
significantly to understanding variability in municipal climate activism after 
accounting for the influence of State Leader. Despite the lower than expected 
amount of explained variance, the results support the assertion that more proactive 
state energy policy is associated with climate activism at the municipal level.  
 
Table 7 Stepwise Linear Regression Results Predicting State 
Leadership 
Variable B Standard error Beta 
(Constant) 
 
1.500 .116  
Partisanship 
 











     As noted earlier, several sociodemographic and geographic factors are 
associated with energy policy leadership, including coastal location and region 
(Deitchman 2017: 58), civic capacity, and political partisanship (Brody et al. 2009). 
Given the strong association between State Leader and City Ratio, study factors 
were regressed on State Leader. Table 7 presents these results. Only Partisanship 
remained as a significant factor, accounting for approximately half of the variance 
between states (adjusted r2=.519). These results indicate that partisanship is 
strongly associated with state climate and energy leadership. In other words, states 
with a stronger environmental voting record and a larger percentage of the 
population voting Democratic also have a higher State Leadership score.  
     These findings confirm existent research regarding the role of state ideology 
influencing adoption of specific energy and climate policies (Lyon and Yin, 2010; 
Vasseur 2014; Deitchman 2017). As Geri and McNabb (2011) argue, state energy 
policy is more likely now than in the recent past to reflect partisan differences. 
Policy instruments measuring state policy context (CAP, RPS, and EERS) are also 
strongly associated with state partisanship (Pearson correlations .603 to .673). 
These findings correspond with Bromley-Tujilo et al.’s (2016) research 
demonstrating higher probabilities of policy adoption, particularly CAP and RPS, 
among liberal Democratic legislatures. These results provide at least limited 
support for seeing municipal climate activism as situated in the larger state political 
and policy milieu.  
     As Rabe (2011) noted earlier, state innovation in energy policy, particularly the 
development of state CAPs, occurred at a time when the Democratic Party 
controlled the majority of state houses. Rollbacks or efforts to weaken these policies 
is occurring in some states (Hess et al 2016), raising concerns over the future of 
state-led efforts to promote GHG reductions. As Antonio and Brulle (2011) argue, 
while both parties have promoted neoliberal approaches to energy and 
environmental policy, differences between the two parties has clearly widened with 
time. On the other hand, Hess et al. (2016) demonstrate that Republican dominated 
state legislatures do pass “green laws” when they are consistent with conservative 
ideological frames; i.e., promote regulatory relief, smaller government, and 
voluntary actions. Furthermore, state natural resources, such as renewable energy 
potential, impact likelihood of adoption (Bromley-Tujilo et al. 2016), with wind 
power in Texas being a notable example (Carley 2011; Fischlein et al. 2014). As 
Vasseur (2010) cautions, we should resist viewing the determinants of state energy 
and environmental policy adoption in binary terms. While these results underscore 
 
the importance of partisanship both for understanding state energy policy and sub-




As Bulkeley (2010) notes, national governments around the world have provided 
only limited and largely inconsistent support for climate change policy and action. 
Globalization and the transboundary nature of climate change have opened a new 
chapter in environmental governance and an accompanying political economy 
focused on the control of carbon. At this point, however, carbon control is a largely 
voluntary enterprise (Engel 2006); thus, its implications for an emerging political 
economy remain unclear. For now, how cities and states interpret the climate 
dilemma and implement policies related to the reduction of GHG emissions is 
central to the future of climate debate.  
     To date, little research has examined the interconnection between US states and 
municipal climate activism, each being viewed as responding to differing 
exigencies when addressing the problem of global climate change (Krause 
2010:47). The declining role of the national government (at least for now) 
necessitates further exploration of how state-level factors impinge on efforts of 
cities to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This research has confirmed the 
association of certain state-level sociodemographic factors with municipal climate 
activism, particularly energy policy leadership, percentage of Democratic voters, 
and state environmental voting record.  
     This research highlights the significance of partisanship and energy policy at the 
state level for understanding municipal climate activism. These results are 
significant for a number of reasons. States, cities, and non-state actors are likely the 
primary locus of policy implementation in the US, at least in the near term. Abbott 
and Kasprzyk (2012) note that the emerging “disarticulated federalism” of climate 
change policy produces both significant innovation and future uncertainty. There is 
much promise, as former NYC Mayor Bloomberg (2017) recently suggested, in 
realizing the Paris Agreement with policies and actions already on the ground. 
Whether states, cities, and other sub-state actors can effectively reduce GHG 
emissions in the absence of federal leadership remains an open question. It is clear 
that more politically motivated states and cities will continue to act in ways 
consistent with a retreat from the carbon era, albeit with differing motivations and 
issue framing. 
 
     While cities and some states have made significant strides reducing carbon 
emissions, more coordination across levels of government, including regional 
planning associations (Barbour and Deakin (2012), is required. As Betsill (2001) 
notes, climate change policy is inherently intergovernmental. Thus understanding 
the city-state relationship is imperative but only part of the larger context of 
multilevel climate governance. While state partisanship serves both to enable and 
constrain local climate action, such differences may decline as states transition from 
climate mitigation to adaptation (Wang 2012). Given the near abdication of federal 
government and the varying context of state energy leadership, municipalities are 
clearly the most significant force for climate action. As Bulkeley (2010: 231) 
argues, understanding municipal climate activism “. . . requires a more nuanced 
concept of the city as a site within which climate governance is taking place.”  The 
latter point recognizes the need to examine the unique exigencies facing 
municipalities as they address climate change as well as the larger 
intergovernmental milieu. Osofsky’s (2012) research on Minnesota’s GreenStep 
Cities Program5 underscores the potential of enabling state energy legislation for 
encouraging voluntary municipal climate action among suburban cities who vary 
significantly in core needs, institutional and financial capacity, and partisanship. A 
multiscaled approach (McKendy 2015), one that includes statewide and regional 





1. The United States Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement began with a 
series of discussions at the “Sundance Summit” in July of 2004, in Salt Lake City, and 
approved at the June 2005 meeting of the mayors. In March 2007, the Climate Protection 
Center (CPC) was officially launched (USCM 2007). The USCM also began recognizing 
outstanding cities through its Climate Protection Awards. These annual awards recognize 
the best practices of cities for their work in promoting climate protection. CPC provides 
resources such as reports on best practices (USCM 2011, 2014, 2014), press releases, the 
current list of participating cities, and the MCPA form. Following President Trump’s June 
2017 withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in June 2017, several cities, states, universities 
and colleges, and businesses signed an open letter to the President entitled ”We are Still 
In” (Alverz 2017; Popvich and Schlossberg 2017)). The USCM passed a nonbinding 
resolution at its annual meeting exhorting President Trump to remain in the Paris Climate 
Accord, along with additional resolutions promoting renewable energy, addressing rising 
sea levels, energy efficiency, and the like (USCM 2017).  
 
2. For additional background on the evolution of subnational city networks, see Reckien et 
al. (2015), Osofsky (2012), Betsill and Bulkely (2006), and Bulkeley (2010).  
 
3. Assessing which states are leaders depends on how factors are weighted. Deitchman’s 
(2017)  typology assigns states into “leader” and “laggard” status based on seven 
dichotomous energy measures, including energy efficiency standards, renewable energy 
portfolio standard, and adoption of a Climate Action Plan (p. 57). In addition, innovations 
in state financing of energy program is another defining feature of energy leadership. 
Leader states tend to be heavily concentrated in Democratic, Western, and Northeastern 
states. Fuel type is also relevant to ranking, as leaders are more likely to be states not reliant 
on coal as the predominant fuel source.  
 
4. Few studies examine the impact of statewide energy policy on sub-state actors. Abbott and 
Kasprzyk (2012) demonstrate a strong association between climate policy scores at the 
state-level and climate action planning for higher educational institutions who are 
signatories of the American College and Universities Presidents’ Climate Commitment 









Appendix A. Variable and Data Sources 
 
State Characteristic Source and Year 
Percentage of state population covered by 
agreement 
Ratio of signatory cities to cities with a 
population of 25,000 or more 
US Mayors Conference 2006-2012 
 





Population size and density (estimate) Census Bureau 2012 
Civic Capacity: Percentage with Bachelor's 
degree, and Average State Income 
ACS 2009 
Gini Index Census Bureau 2010 
League of Conservation Voters scorecard for US 
Congress 
League of Conservation Voters 2006-
2010 
Percentage change in Presidential voting for 
Democratic President (2004 to 2012) 
Federal Election Commission 2004, 
2008, 2012 
Environmental Organizations (501(c)(3) 
organizations from Tax Form 990) 
National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (2014) 
Carbon Employment: percentage of workers 
employed in extractive, manufacturing, 
transportation, or production occupations 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010 
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